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Differences in Ethical 
Perceptions of Insider Trading
Gerhard Hambusch, David Michayluk, Kevin Terhaar,  
and Gerhard Van de Venter
KEY FINDINGS
n In most jurisdictions, trading on material nonpublic information is prohibited, even when 
an investment manager is required to act in clients’ best interests. Instead, the require-
ment to maintain market integrity typically trumps clients’ interests.
n Our survey results show that trading on inside information for personal benefit is viewed 
as significantly more unethical than is trading on inside information for the benefit of 
clients. Professionals with a specialized investment credential are the most stringent in 
their views.
n Because protecting clients from potentially adverse market movements is desirable, 
and is viewed as somewhat ethical, our results suggest that the legal primacy of market 
integrity should be reexamined.
ABSTRACT
This article examines ethical decision-making related to insider trading. Using case study 
scenarios, the authors shed light on differences in evaluating the use of material nonpub-
lic information when the expected outcomes of insider trading benefit clients versus the 
investment professional trading on inside information. Participants perceive insider trading 
that is expected to benefit clients to be a less egregious ethical violation, even though it is 
as equally illegal as trading to benefit oneself directly. Although the judgment about insider 
trading should be independent of the benefit recipient, it is not. Given the increasing regu-
latory scrutiny of ethical behavior, this finding is important because professionals’ duties to 
(1) pursue clients’ best interests and (2) protect capital markets may represent conflicting 
obligations when evaluating whether to use material nonpublic information. In addition, the 
results show that individuals with a professional credential tend to view insider trading to 
be more unethical compared with others without a credential.
TOPICS
Legal/regulatory/public policy, security analysis and valuation, risk management*
One of the greatest challenges to the orderly functioning of capital markets is the undermining of market integrity through the use of material nonpublic informa-tion1 (MNPI), also known as insider trading. In the context of some of the world’s 
1 Material nonpublic information is defined as information that is related to a business entity and 
that is not publicly known. Also known as inside information, examples of this type of information include 
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largest crises, insider trading has become a “symbol of moral bankruptcy” (Robinson 
2020). A recent example is when US senators Richard Burr and Kelly Loeffler allegedly 
used negative inside information obtained from the Senate Intelligence Committee to 
sell stocks in advance and avoid losses during the COVID-19 crisis in March 2020. 
Trading on MNPI is just one of many ethical dilemmas that investment profession-
als face in their normal course of business. Frequently, solutions to these dilemmas 
are clear and often guided by the law—for example, avoiding a conflict of interest. 
However, that is not always the case. One dilemma in particular—whether to trade 
on MNPI to benefit a client—pits the investment professional’s duty to act in the best 
interests of clients2 against the responsibility to protect market integrity. Although 
authors such as Muhtaseb (2018) emphasize the importance of the interests of 
clients and society above those of investment professionals, they do not further dis-
tinguish the potential conflict between clients and society. In many jurisdictions, the 
required course of action is clear: market integrity (duty to society) eclipses the pro-
fessional’s duty to clients, which means that MNPI cannot be acted upon even when 
acting on the information would benefit clients. This view is due to the far-reaching and 
potentially catastrophic negative impact on the integrity, and therefore functioning, 
of capital markets if MNPI is used to trade.
Many investment managers may question this priority of capital market integrity 
over client interests. In fact, we believe that managers often feel that they should 
rank clients’ interests above market integrity and have an internal conflict when 
having to curtail their trading at the expense of their clients. This dilemma serves as 
our motivation and sparked our interested in investigating whether our assessment 
was true and shared more widely by the investment community, and also whether it 
extended to the wider noninvestment public.
To explore this interest, we conducted a survey that gauged responses to a set 
of scenarios in which an investment professional decides whether to trade on MNPI. 
Survey participants were asked to rate the degree of unethical behavior in each of 
the scenarios. We find that people clearly distinguish degrees of unethical behavior 
when evaluating the professional’s actions related to insider trading. Survey respon-
dents rated insider trading that is intended to benefit clients as significantly less 
unethical than insider trading that benefits the investment professional personally. 
This supports our assumption about priority of client interests, even though some 
may find the result surprising given the lack of difference in the intrinsic value of the 
use of inside information in either case. 
Ultimately, we hope to start a conversation about whether the legally mandated 
priority of interests—compelling investment managers to disadvantage clients in 
order to uphold market integrity—is always desirable. Such a discussion is important 
given the differences in judgment of insider trading we have observed. Professionals 
struggle to reconcile the competing objectives of market protection and pursuit of 
clients’ interests, and it does not appear to be clear why a legal mandate prohibiting 
the use of MNPI overrides the important consideration of putting client interests first 
at all times. Accounting for the greater good of preserved market integrity can conflict 
with professional principles to put clients first. Do these conflicting objectives affect 
the perception of the degree of ethical violation around insider trading? 
earnings announcements, changes to executives, and potential acquisition activities. For an overview 
of the enforcement of insider-trading laws, see Kamman and Hood (2010).
2 As an example, in Australia, and with regards to financial professionals who advise clients (financial 
advisors), the Corporations Act 2001 was modified through The Corporations Amendment (Further Future 
of Financial Advice Measures) Act 2012 on July 1, 2012. It contains, among many other measures, a 
statutory fiduciary duty on financial advisors to act in the best interests of their clients, which defines 
an advisor’s best interest duty. This duty represents a codification of the existing common law fiduciary 
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The remainder of the article is structured as follows. First, we present the 
motivation for and background of this study. We then describe the survey methodol-
ogy, data, and analysis. Finally, we discuss results and implications of our analysis and 
draw conclusions for investment managers and the broader investment community. 
BACKGROUND
The ethics of trading on MNPI has been argued extensively in academic literature. 
The main philosophical arguments against insider trading are largely based on ethi-
cal principles such as fairness and rights. One view is that MNPI provides an unfair 
advantage over other participants that lack the same level of inside information. 
This is deemed to be unfair because MNPI provides the insider with the opportunity 
to earn (potentially excessive) profits or avoid losses. A second viewpoint, and often 
considered from a legal perspective, is that MNPI is the property of an owner (i.e., a 
firm) and must not be misappropriated by either insiders or outsiders for their personal 
gain. It is therefore suggested that firms have the right to decide on timing and cir-
cumstances of disclosure of MNPI. A final argument against insider trading is that, if 
investors perceive trading based on MNPI to be widespread in financial markets, they 
would be reluctant to participate and trade in these markets. This ultimately reduces 
market efficiency as trading activity decreases, potentially leading to complete market 
lockup or failure (Luberti 1984).
On the other side, the arguments in favor of insider trading are typically of an 
economic nature and based on an improvement in market efficiency (Luberti 1984; 
McGee 2009). This view suggests that insiders’ trades should move a stock’s price 
toward its true fundamental value that reflects all available material information at 
a point in time. Finally, philosophical arguments by Ma and Sun (1998) and Moore 
(2017) challenge the interpretation of fairness by pointing out that those opposed to 
insider trading typically cannot even agree on what insider trading actually means.
Our study draws its inspiration from two theoretical articles. First, Lydenberg 
(2014) contrasts two groups of fiduciaries in financial markets. The first group (“rea-
sonable”) is focused on legal principles concerned with the prudent and long-term 
stability of financial markets and the consideration of society. In contrast, the primary 
concern of the second group (“rational”) is the sole financial benefit of individual cli-
ents. If trading on MNPI is done by any means possible (i.e., rational), it could imply 
doing so at the short-term expense of other market participants.  
Second, in an article by Engelen and Van Liedekerke (2007), the authors attempt 
to bridge the gap between “reasonable” and “rational” by discussing how different 
types of insider trading are not all equally unethical. They distinguish between market 
manipulation and trading on inside information. In addition, they contrast corporate 
insiders and those who steal information. According to their argument, there is a case 
to be made for allowing insider trading if its user does not attempt to manipulate the 
market or misappropriate/steal information. 
Our study expands on this notion by providing alternative scenarios in which trad-
ing on MNPI could be viewed as encompassing various degrees of unethical behavior. 
In our scenarios, similar to Engelen and Van Liedekerke, there is no attempt by a 
market participant to manipulate the price of a stock. However, there is a misappro-
priation of MNPI according to their definition because the character in the scenarios 
(an investment analyst) is not a corporate insider.
Our approach differs from theirs in that we hypothesize that the motivation and 
intent behind the trading on MNPI is the key to the perception of its ethical nature. 
We contend that if trading on MNPI has no direct personal financial benefit but 
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firm’s clients), this behavior is possibly not misappropriation or stealing of information. 
We question if this action could therefore be considered less unethical. This depends 
critically on whether the use of MNPI is taken to be for personal benefit or for 
another use. 
The key question we investigate is whether individuals view the use of MNPI to 
benefit clients as less egregious an ethical violation as the use of MNPI to benefit 
oneself directly—in other words, whether a financial professional who fulfills a duty to 
clients mitigates partially or fully the unethical nature of insider trading that violates 
the duty to maintain market integrity. 
Furthermore, among all professional credentials held by surveyed respondents, 
the Chartered Financial Analyst (CFA) Program emphasizes education aimed at invest-
ment professionals performing financial analysis and undertaking portfolio manage-
ment. The program contains an ethics and professional standards component, making 
it of special interest for our case scenario investigation. Important for this study, the 
CFA Program’s ethics curriculum incorporates in its entirety the CFA Institute Code of 
Ethics and Standards of Professional Conduct, with the former being a principle-based 
code and the latter being a rules-based set of standards, behavioral requirements, 
and recommendations, as well as practical examples (CFA Institute 2014). Since we 
consider this comprehensive framework consisting of a code, a set of standards, 
and examples with application to investment analysis and investment management 
as the most applicable professional credentialing training directly related to this 
study’s insider-trading case and scenarios, we use it as an example of a relevant 
professional credentialing ethics curriculum. In particular, Standard II(A) (“Material 
Nonpublic Information”) and Standard III(A) (“Loyalty, Prudence and Care”) are relevant 
for our study, as they cover MNPI and duties to clients (see Appendix A). Interestingly, 
and related to an investment professional’s potentially conflicting duties to capital 
markets and clients, these standards require on one hand that an individual must not 
engage in insider trading and on the other that the individual must put their clients’ 
best interests before their own or their employer’s best interests.
INVESTIGATION AND RESULTS
Survey Design
Our investigation is based on a survey in which we present two scenarios of 
trading on MNPI to a broad range of individuals, both professional investors and non-
investment individuals. In both scenarios, participants rated an analyst’s behavior on 
a Likert-type scale of 1 (very unethical) to 7 (very ethical). The storyline of the scenar-
ios is as follows: A buy-side security analyst (“Myer”) is employed by an investment 
firm (“AlphaCo”). During a site visit to a pharmaceutical company (“DeveloPharm”), 
Myer obtains MNPI3 that strongly indicates a poor outcome in a drug trial for one of 
DeveloPharm’s most promising treatments. Upon returning to her office, Myer decides 
whether to act on the MNPI (see Appendix B for details).
To analyze survey participants’ perception about acting on MNPI, the initial case 
is extended using two scenarios that reflect Myer’s decision regarding what to do with 
the MNPI. The two scenarios are identical in all respects except for differences in 
which party owns DeveloPharm shares (AlphaCo’s client portfolios or Myer personally) 
3 The case scenarios in our survey were designed to fit the Luberti (1984) definition of MNPI. The 
scenarios were designed to reflect an expected negative impact on the value of DeveloPharm once the 
information of the negative trial results becomes known to the public. This study’s MNPI case is also 
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and whether the party uses and benefits from the 
MNPI (AlphaCo’s client portfolios or Myer personally). 
In our scenarios, there is no attempt to manipulate 
the market for DeveloPharm shares, ruling out the 
possibility of this type of unethical behavior. The two 
scenarios are summarized in Exhibit 1.
In Scenario 1, only Myer holds shares—in her per-
sonal portfolio—and the firm does not own shares in 
any client accounts or commingled funds, so none 
of the firm’s clients is potentially affected by the use 
of the MNPI. Myer has “negative MNPI,” which she expects to cause an imminent 
decline in the stock price of DeveloPharm. She acts on the information by selling her 
personal holdings. Therefore, Scenario 1 is similar to the public’s common view of 
insider trading as being unethical and illegal, where a character uses MNPI to enrich 
themselves (or, in this case, to avoid a personal loss). Clearly, this use of MNPI 
would be deemed unethical by many investment professionals, and it is commonly 
prohibited by regulators.
In Scenario 2, the firm holds many of the shares in its mutual fund, but Myer 
does not hold any in her personal portfolio. Myer uses the “negative MNPI” by inform-
ing AlphaCo’s fund managers that she has changed her outlook on DeveloPharm 
from positive to negative. She does not inform the fund managers that her outlook 
has changed, because she holds negative inside information. As a result of Myer’s 
changed outlook, AlphaCo immediately sells all the DeveloPharm shares held by the 
fund. The case makes clear that the sale is expected to benefit the firm’s clients by 
eliminating any potential share price decline. Most regulatory authorities consider 
this use of MNPI to also be unethical based on fairness arguments and therefore 
prohibit trading on it. In essence, trading in this scenario is viewed from a legal sense 
as essentially the same as trading on MNPI for personal benefit. However, we were 
interested in whether investment professionals and noninvestment survey respon-
dents would make that same assessment, or would instead consider protection of 
client interests to be more-ethical behavior.
While trading on MNPI is often thought of as undertaken for personal benefit, as 
in Scenario 1, professional investment managers can face an ethical dilemma: The 
duty to clients can be at odds with the duty to uphold market integrity. Scenario 2 
represents this ethical dilemma by investigating whether survey participants place 
a higher priority on market integrity or on the duty the manager owes to the client—
fiduciary duties that are in conflict in our scenarios.
Our article is unique in that we hypothesize that ethical behavior is not always 
absolute but rather that the motivation for the insider trading is key to assessing its 
ethical nature. We contend that if trading on MNPI has no personal benefit but rather 
leads to material gains for someone who is owed a fiduciary duty (i.e., the firm’s cli-
ents), this behavior is not on the same level as misappropriation of information for 
personal benefit and could therefore be considered less unethical.
Characteristics of Survey Respondents
We administered an online survey that was developed and distributed using the 
Survey Monkey platform. Survey invitations were sent to the broad industry and aca-
demic network of the authors. After providing demographic information and reading 
the case, respondents were asked to rate the ethical nature of the analyst’s action 
for the scenarios. 
Response scores range from 1 (very unethical) to 7 (very ethical). A total of 
551 responses to the online survey were received between June 5, 2017, and 
EXHIBIT 1
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July 21, 2017. After excluding 21 invalid survey results, the final sample consisted 
of 530 respondents. 
The respondents represented an array of backgrounds, including investment 
professionals, professionals employed outside the investment industry, and university 
students. Appendix C presents a summary of key demographic statistics.
Although the majority (66.4%) of respondents are male, this overrepresentation 
is considerably less than the gender imbalance of investment market professionals 
in global capital markets. Estimates of the share of female investment professionals 
range from less than 10% for US mutual fund managers (Lutton and Davis 2015) to 
39% of CFA Program Candidates in 2019 (CFA Institute 2019). Survey respondents 
spanned a broad age group with a global representation. Finally, financial profession-
als constitute the largest category of respondents.
The professional credentials we identified include several key designations com-
monly held by members of the global financial industry and fall into two main cat-
egories: investment related and accounting related. Of the 530 valid respondents, 
231 (43.6%) possessed one or more of the professional credentials summarized in 
Appendix D. Holders of the CFA charter constituted 190 (35.8%) of all respondents. 
Survey Results
As summarized in Exhibit 1, Scenario 1 denotes the use of MNPI for the benefit of 
the analyst (Myer), whereas in Scenario 2 the firm’s clients benefit. Overall, responses 
to both scenarios ranged between 1 and 7, with a score of 1 meaning that survey 
respondents rated the behavior as very unethical and a score of 7 meaning that the 
behavior was rated as very ethical. In other words, a low average score for a specific 
scenario indicates that respondents perceived Myer’s action to be unethical, whereas 
a high score indicates that respondents viewed her actions as ethical. As a result, 
we expect a lower mean score for the scenario in which Myer holds shares personally 
and benefits from MNPI (Scenario 1). By contrast, we expect higher scores in the 
scenario in which the firm’s clients hold shares and benefit from MNPI (Scenario 2). 
Exhibit 2 summarizes the statistical analysis of the differences between the two 
scenarios. The main analysis that we focused on is determining whether the average 
rating of the two case study scenarios differs by a statistically significant amount. 
Differences in means were tested using three measures: a t-test, Wilcoxon rank, 
and sign test.
First, it is important to note that the mean scores of the two scenarios were differ-
ent by 0.38. The statistical analysis in Exhibit 2 indicates (the t-test, Wilcoxon signed 
rank test, and sign test) that the difference in respondents’ perception between the 
two scenarios of 0.38 is not only economically meaningful but also statistically sig-
nificant. In other words, there is an actual and sizable 
difference in the perception of respondents between 
the two scenarios. Based on the statistical signifi-
cance in a difference in means test, using the MNPI for 
the benefit of clients was deemed to be more ethical 
(a higher score of 2.87) than using it for personal bene-
fit (a lower score of 2.49). In other words, respondents 
perceive trading on MNPI to be less ethical if it leads 
to personal benefit rather than benefiting clients.
The results from Exhibit 2 are very clear. Respon-
dents overwhelmingly viewed the investment analyst 
Myer’s use of MNPI for her personal benefit to be 
significantly more unethical than her use of it for the 
benefit of the firm’s clients. Given the difference in 
EXHIBIT 2
Mean Difference Tests for Scenarios
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average scores, it is clear that respondents felt that Myer was, to some extent, acting 
properly in protecting client assets from the potential adverse effect of the MNPI. 
Although her use of MNPI to potentially avoid losses in clients’ portfolios was still 
rated as being unethical because of the violation of duty to maintain market integrity, 
Myer’s unselfish motivation for trading on inside information appears to be a signif-
icant mitigating factor. We next expand our analysis to examine whether individuals 
who have received ethics training as part of obtaining a professional credential exhibit 
a superior ability to evaluate observed unethical behavior. Each of these credentials is 
sponsored or administered by a professional testing and/or member organization and 
includes in its examinations an ethics component or module. The general summary 
of the extent of the ethics training and/or testing is shown in Appendix E.
Because earning any of the professional credentials involves a substantial amount 
of ethics training and subsequent successful assessment, we expect holders of 
these credentials to be better able to distinguish degrees of (un)ethical behavior. 
In particular, we expect holders of credentials to consider insider trading to be less 
ethical than do respondents who do not hold a professional credential. 
Exhibit 3 presents mean difference test results for survey responses for the 
two case study scenarios. Group 1 represents respondents without any credential; 
Group 2 represents respondents that hold one or more credentials.
The results in Exhibit 3 confirm our expectation. For holders of a credential, the 
mean score is meaningfully (0.93 for Scenario 1, and 1.16 for Scenario 2) lower than 
for those without a credential. These results suggest that receiving ethics training 
as part of earning a professional credential increases the ability to identify unethical 
behavior. The observed large relative differences suggest that respondents who have 
earned one (or more) professional credential(s) judge unethical behaviors as signifi-
cantly more unethical compared with survey respondents without any credential and 
related ethics training. 
Because of the exclusive focus on investment-related matters, which include 
assessing insider-trading dilemmas as part of the credentialing training, we expect 
that holders of the investment-focused CFA designation should be in a better position 
to evaluate unethical investment-related behavior compared with those without CFA 
designation. Exhibit 4 presents mean difference tests for CFA charterholders versus 
non-CFA charterholders. 
These results suggest that CFA charterholders rate the behavior in these (uneth-
ical) categories as more unethical compared with respondents who have not earned 
the CFA designation. Therefore, and on average, CFA charterholders in our sample 
EXHIBIT 3
Mean Difference Tests for Professional Credentials
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appear to be significantly better at identifying observed unethical behavior (and 
assigning a corresponding lower value to express this judgment) when compared 
with non-CFA charterholders, irrespective of the modifications of unethical behavior 
presented across several scenarios. We note that the absolute differences for both 
scenarios are higher (1.03 and 1.37) compared with those results in Exhibit 3 that 
include any credential(s).
DISCUSSION
Our results demonstrate that the investment community makes distinctions when 
making decisions about ethical dilemmas. In effect, when people assess the degree 
to which behavior is potentially unethical, they take into consideration the motivation 
and the intended beneficiary of the behavior. 
Our survey results have three important implications that are particularly rele-
vant, not only for portfolio managers and other investment professionals but also for 
regulators and lawmakers.
First and most important, our study provides evidence that insider trading can 
present an ethical dilemma, and individuals may disagree about its ethical implica-
tions. Given that our results show that differences in the ethical evaluation of insider 
trading exist subject to who receives benefits from the transaction, this highlights 
differences in individuals’ value systems and duty perceptions. Statistically important 
judgment differences related to the morality of insider trading must be recognized 
when protecting markets and clients’ best interests.
Second, the analysis of survey responses indicates that individuals who hold 
professional credentials tend to have a more critical view of insider trading than do 
individuals without such credentials. In addition, holding a credential that relates more 
specifically to financial analysis and investment management increases the effect. 
In particular, we are able to show that respondents who have earned the CFA desig-
nation, and who therefore have undergone training specifically in investment-related 
ethical situations as part of the CFA Program, are the most stringent in their views. 
This finding is important because it supports the benefit to be gained from general 
training in ethics and from more specific training that is relevant to the ethical sit-
uations that are found in the investment profession. This corresponds to the view 
of Muhtaseb (2018), who suggests a professional framework and code of conduct 
EXHIBIT 4
Mean Difference Tests for Chartered Financial Analyst (CFA) Designation
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(such as that of CFA Institute) to be a viable solution to address ethical issues that 
are complex in nature.
Third, and with reference to compensatory and retributive justice, these results 
support starting a conversation regarding the appropriate magnitude of penalties 
for unethical behavior by investment professionals, depending on the motivation 
for their actions. It is a permissible question as to whether the manager should be 
punished less severely if there is no direct personal benefit, as in the case when 
trading on MNPI is for the clients’ benefit only. This is not to say that this behavior 
is ethical, but rather to point out that there are shades of gray when duties conflict. 
When a manager is faced with conflicting duties, perhaps the penalties for uneth-
ical behavior should be tempered because of the motivation and responsibility to 
benefit clients.
Ultimately, respondents of all types perceive that the motivation for using MNPI 
is key to determining the degree to which a behavior is unethical. This indicates that, 
at a minimum, the industry could benefit from a discussion about whether insider 
trading for the benefit of clients should be punished less severely than insider trading 
for personal benefit.
CONCLUSION
Our study uses a survey with two scenarios in a financial analysis and investment 
management context where a decision is made to trade on MNPI either for personal 
gain or for the benefit of clients. The analysis of survey responses indicates that 
individuals perceive trading on MNPI for the benefit of clients to be a less egregious 
ethical violation, even though the intrinsic act of the trading is identical and just as 
illegal as trading to benefit oneself directly. 
Given that survey participants clearly consider benefiting personally from MNPI to 
be more unethical than clients benefiting from MNPI, our results raise a question for 
investment professionals and regulators: Should the penalty for trading on MNPI for 
the benefit of clients be less severe than the penalty for trading on MNPI for personal 
benefit? It could be argued that, under certain ethical principles (including, e.g., duty, 
rights, or welfare), the priority of market integrity should perhaps be reduced relative 
to the fiduciary duty the firm owes to the client.
APPENDIX A
This appendix presents the two CFA Institute Standards most relevant to our study 
of client’s best interest and use of inside information. These Standards are Standard 
II(A) (“Material Nonpublic Information”) and Standard III(A) (“Loyalty, Prudence and 
Care”). The CFA Institute Standards of Professional Conduct as part of the CFA Institute 
Standards of Practice Handbook (CFA Institute 2014) constitute the ethics curriculum of 
CFA Program. The Standards are organized in categories covering professionalism, mar-
ket integrity, duties to clients and employer, and additional standards, including a set of 
Standards addressing conflicts of interests. We also note that the CFA Program curriculum 
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APPENDIX B
EXHIBIT A1
Summary of CFA Institute Standards
Standard Text
Members and Candidates who possess material nonpublic
 information that could affect the value of an investment must
 not act or cause others to act on the information.
Members and Candidates have a duty of loyalty to their clients
 and must act with reasonable care and exercise prudent
 judgment. Members and Candidates must act for the benet of
 their clients and place their clients’ interests before their













Susan Myer is an analyst at the investment rm AlphaCo that manages an equity fund in which clients invest. The country in which
 AlphaCo and Myer are situated does not have strict securities laws and regulations.
•  AlphaCo does not hold any DeveloPharm shares in its fund
•  AlphaCo holds a large number of DeveloPharm shares in its fund
•  Myer does not hold any DeveloPharm shares in her personal portfolio
After returning to her ofce that afternoon, Myer informs AlphaCo’s fund managers that she has changed her outlook on DeveloPharm
 from positive to negative. As a result, AlphaCo immediately sells all of the fund’s DeveloPharm shares. Two weeks later, DeveloPharm
 publicly announces that the medication trial was a failure and DeveloPharm’s shares lose half of their value in that day’s trading.
On a scale from 1 to 7, how do you rate the ethical nature of Myer’s action to inform AlphaCo’s fund managers that she has changed her
 outlook on DeveloPharm from positive to negative?
•  Myer holds a large number of DeveloPharm shares in her personal portfolio
After returning to her ofce that afternoon, Myer sells all of the DeveloPharm shares from her personal portfolio. Two weeks later,
 DeveloPharm publicly announces that the medication trial was a failure and DeveloPharm’s shares lose half of their value in that
day’s trading.
On a scale from 1 to 7, how do you rate the ethical nature of Myer’s action to sell the shares of DeveloPharm from her
 personal portfolio?
Myer analyses a pharmaceutical company, DeveloPharm, which is developing a new medication to treat cancer. A large trial of the
 medication was undertaken with test patients, but results have not yet been disclosed publicly.
As part of her analysis, Myer meets with several of DeveloPharm’s senior executives. The visit includes a tour of the production facilities
 with one of DeveloPharm’s managers. During the tour and without intent, Myer notices a document on a desk. The front page reveals to
 Myer that the medication’s trial was a failure, that is, the medication has not proven to be effective in treating cancer.
NOTES: The guidance includes that “Standard III(A) clarifies that client interests are paramount. A member’s or candidate’s 
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APPENDIX C
EXHIBIT C1

















SCEN1 = Myer MNPI



















































































































































































120 | Differences in Ethical Perceptions of Insider Trading  April 2021
EXHIBIT C1 (continued)
Summary Descriptive Statistics of Survey Variables and Responses
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EXHIBIT C1 (continued)
Summary Descriptive Statistics of Survey Variables and Responses
APPENDIX D














































































 Management Accountant 
Chartered Alternative
















Current organization was formed in 2014 by merger of
 Institute of Chartered Accountants Australia and NZ ICA 
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Program established in 1963 (rst exam cohort)
Established in 2012
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EXHIBIT E1

















CA of Australia & New Zealand. Capstone modules (cap218 and cap318) include the following
Module Outcome:
4. Behave ethically. By the end of the module, candidates will have developed
competence in a range of business and professional accounting contexts to:
•   Discuss the relevant Code of Ethics.
•   Identify ethical dilemmas and apply a structured process to resolve those dilemmas.
•   Apply, and act in accord with, the relevant Code of Ethics.
AICPA (US) includes ethics in 2 of the 4 modules/topic areas on the CPA exam:
AUD: Auditing and Attestation—Ethics, Professional Responsibilities and General Principles (15%–25%)
REG: Regulation—Ethics, Professional Responsibilities and Federal Tax Procedures (10%–20%)
All CFA exams contains an ethics component—Level I (15%), Level II (10%–15%), and
Level III (10%–15%). The curriculum is based on the CFA Code of Ethics and Standards of Professional
Conduct, which includes Standards related to
•   Professionalism
•   Integrity of Capital Markets
•   Duties to Clients
•   Duties to Employers
•   Investment Analysis, Recommendations, and Actions
•   Conicts of Interest
•   Responsibilities as a CFA Institute member or CFA candidate
Syllabus mentions “ethics, integrity and professionalism” under Leadership Skills in the Competency
Framework, but main topic area weights do not explicitly identify any ethics component. Ethics is
included in some of the subtopics; for example, mention is made under Organizational Management
that it includes “Personal business ethics and the fundamental principles (Part A) of the CIMA
Code of Ethics for Professional Accountants”
CAIA Level I exam contains 15%–20% ethics component at Level I and 10% at Level II. Ethics
curriculum is modelled after CFA Institute and incorporates CFA Standards of Practice Handbook:
Professional Standards and Ethics
•   Professionalism
•   Integrity of Capital Markets
•   Duties to Clients
•   Duties to Employers
•   Investment Analysis, Recommendations, and Actions
•   Conicts of Interest
CFP exam blueprint shows the following:
A. Professional Conduct and Regulation (7%)
A.1. CFP Board’s Code of Ethics and Professional Responsibility and Rules of Conduct
A.2. CFP Board’s Financial Planning Practice Standards
A.3. CFP Board’s Disciplinary Rules and Procedures
A.4. Function, purpose, and regulation of nancial institutions
A.5. Financial services regulations and requirements
A.6. Consumer protection laws
A.7. Fiduciary
Ethics constitutes 15% of the exam both at Level I and at Level II. CFA Institute program, so
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